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Unfair and Unintended:
The Tax-Exempt Organization Blocker Loophole
I. INTRODUCTION
Politicians love to attack the Internal Revenue Code (the
“Code”). Arguably, it is too long, too complicated, and full of
loopholes that benefit the wealthy. Even tax lawyers and certified
public accountants who have devoted their professional lives to
studying tax law and tax accounting cannot easily understand the
Code’s complexity. Indeed, even judges, whom society esteems to be
the final authority on all things legal, have an extraordinarily difficult
time parsing the Code’s complicated terminology. While referring to
a particular Subchapter K Code section, one judge famously stated,
“Surely, a statute has not achieved ‘simplicity’ when its complex
provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a
comparatively small number of specialists who have been initiated
into its mysteries.” 1
Some of the Code’s greatest “mysteries” live in the world of
international taxation. The Code is full of complicated tax rules for
various types of entities, including tax-exempt organizations, which
earn income abroad. The Code is littered with loopholes. In addition
to the potential lost revenue from legally exploited loopholes, an IRS
consultant estimated that the United States Treasury loses $70
billion annually in revenue due to offshore tax evasion. 2
Tax-exempt organizations are able to use the foreign blocker
corporation loophole in conjunction with their hedge fund
investments to decrease their potential tax liability. This Comment
argues that tax-exempt organizations should not be able to receive
tax-free dividends from foreign blocker corporations that invest in
hedge funds for three reasons: (1) the blocker corporation is an
unintended consequence of the unrelated business taxable income
(“UBTI”) rules; (2) the blocker corporation structure fails a
substance over form analysis; and (3) closing the loophole will
provide increased revenue to the United States Treasury.
1. Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964).
2. Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 227 n.7 (2012).
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This Comment is divided into several parts. Part II discusses taxexempt organizations and their relation to hedge funds. Part III
discusses the foreign blocker corporation and passive foreign
investment companies (“PFICs”). Part IV discusses the reasons why
Congress should close the blocker loophole. Part V provides several
suggestions on how the loophole might be wholly or partially closed:
(1) amending the § 1291 PFIC rules; (2) amending the § 512 UBTI
exceptions; (3) increasing the § 4940 and § 4944 taxes on private
foundations; and (4) applying the § 4940 and § 4944 proposed
changes to all tax-exempt organizations by amending § 509. Part VI
concludes.
II. TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND HEDGE FUNDS

A. Tax-Exempt Organizations in a Nutshell
Generally, if an organization meets the requirements of a taxexempt organization under § 501 of the Code, then it will be exempt
from federal income tax. 3 The most famous tax-exempt
organizations are § 501(c)(3) organizations, which include public
charities (e.g., the Red Cross), operating foundations, and private
foundations (e.g., the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). 4 All
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from federal income tax, 5 and
a donor’s contribution to a § 501(c)(3) organization can be deducted
from the donor’s federal tax liability.6
Although data is extremely limited regarding which tax-exempt
organizations use the foreign blocker corporation loophole, due to
the costs associated with complex tax structuring, there is good
reason to believe that many asset-rich, tax-exempt organizations
utilize the blocker corporation scheme, including public charities,
university endowments, churches, and private foundations. 7

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I.R.C. § 501 (2012).

See id. § 501(c)(3).
Id. § 501(a).
Id. § 170(a).
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.

ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART II
(Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter TAX TREATMENT II].
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B. The Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations

1. UBTI
In 1950, Congress passed rules that imposed a tax on a taxexempt organization’s unrelated business income. 8 Before the rules
were created, some tax-exempt organizations started to look too
commercial in nature, and the government feared that tax-exempt
organizations could distort the market by selling goods at a belowmarket price while still obtaining a market rate of return due to their
tax-exemption. 9 Under the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress passed
rules that placed an income tax on any part of a tax-exempt
organization’s income that met the following requirements: (1)
income received was from a trade or business; (2) the trade or
business was “regularly carried on” by the tax-exempt organization;
and (3) the trade or business was not “substantially related” to the
tax-exempt organization’s purpose (income that met these
requirements is referred to as unrelated business taxable income or
UBTI). 10 Certain exceptions were included in the UBTI Rules. For
example, dividends, interest, royalties, and other passive types of
income were exempt from the UBTI regime. 11
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress passed more
comprehensive rules relating to debt-financed income and indicated
that interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and certain other types of
payments from debt-financed transactions unrelated to a tax-exempt
organization’s purpose would also be taxed as UBTI.12 The
provisions targeting debt-financed income were primarily aimed at

8. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 230.
9. Id.
10. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2012).
11. Id. § 512(b). Additionally, there are other exceptions to the UBTI rules, but those
exceptions are inapplicable to this Comment.
Other exemptions from the unrelated business income tax are provided for activities
in which substantially all the work is performed by volunteers, for income from the
sale of donated goods, and for certain activities carried on for the convenience of
members, students, patients, officers, or employees of a charitable organization. In
addition, special unrelated business income tax provisions exempt from tax certain
activities of trade shows and State fairs, income from bingo games, and income from
the distribution of certain low-cost items incidental to the solicitation of charitable
contributions.
TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11.
12. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 232–35.
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stopping sale-leaseback transactions, which allowed tax-exempt
organizations to use their tax-exempt status to distort the market in
ways other than selling goods at a below-market price for a market
rate of return. For example, in a typical sale-leaseback transaction, a
tax-exempt organization would borrow money to finance a real or
personal property purchase from a private individual or company. 13
The seller would normally pay a long-term capital gain tax on the
sale, and the tax-exempt organization would then rent the property
back to the seller. Under this scheme, tax-exempt organizations were
able to charge a below-market rent price to the seller but still receive
a fair market rental payment because the rental income was not
taxable under the UBTI exceptions prior to 1969. 14
After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the exceptions to UBTI,
including those for dividends, interest payments, and royalties, were
not allowed if the income was derived from a debt-financed
investment, otherwise known as a leveraged investment. 15

2. Excise taxes
In addition to the UBTI regime, some tax-exempt organizations
are also subject to excise taxes. Currently, tax-exempt private
foundations are subject to a 2% excise tax on their investment
income under § 4940(a) of the Code. Section 4940(a) reads:
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on its activities, a tax
equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such foundation
for the taxable year. 16

In determining a private foundation’s net investment income for the
current taxable year, the IRS considers the foundation’s income from
interest, dividends, rents, and other passive income sources. 17

13. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 565 (1965) (involving a sale-leaseback
transaction dealing with tangible property).
14. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 46–47 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES].
15. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11.
16. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2012).
17. See
I.R.S.
Ruling,
IRM
7.27.14.4
(Feb.
26,
1999),
available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-027-014.html.
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Additionally, § 4944 of the Code imposes a 10% tax on
investments that may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt
purpose. The statute reads:
If a private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to
jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes, there is
hereby imposed on the making of such investment a tax equal to 10
percent of the amount so invested for each year (or part thereof) in
the taxable period. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid
by the private foundation. 18

The Treasury Regulations (“Regulations”) imply that foundation
managers have great discretion regarding the transactions their
private foundations engage in, and a transaction is only considered
“jeopardizing” to the foundation if it is made without ordinary
business care. The Regulations state that a transaction is
jeopardizing if
it is determined that the foundation managers, in making such
investment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and
prudence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time
of making the investment, in providing for the long- and short-term
financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt
purposes. 19

As the law currently stands, all tax-exempt organizations are
subject to the UBTI regime, but only private foundations are subject
to excise taxes. 20

C. Tax-Exempt Organizations as Domestic Hedge Fund Investors
1. Hedge funds in a nutshell
Hedge funds are large funds that invest primarily in liquid
securities and other assets. They are “actively managed investments
that pool investors’ capital in order to acquire, own, and trade one or
more of securities, commodities, and financial products.” 21 Hedge
fund investors have generally been one of three types: “high networth individuals who are subject to U.S. tax; foreign persons who

18.
19.
20.
21.

I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1).
26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1 (2013).
See I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1).
Brunson, supra note 2, at 236.
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are not otherwise subject to U.S. tax; and U.S. institutional investors
(such as charities and private and government pension funds) that
are tax-exempt under U.S. tax rules.” 22
As of 2006, almost 55% of worldwide hedge funds were
registered offshore, meaning that the funds were registered in
different countries from where the fund was based. 23 Nearly all of
the offshore funds, 92%, were registered in low-tax jurisdictions,
including the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda,
and the Bahamas. 24 Of the remaining worldwide hedge funds, 48%
were registered in the United States, mostly in Delaware. 25

2. Taxation of passed-through profits from hedge funds
In the United States, hedge funds are typically taxed as
partnerships under federal income tax law. 26 When a hedge fund is
structured as a partnership, the fund’s profits and losses are passed
through to its members or investors. 27 Under the UBTI rules,
income passed through from the hedge fund to the tax-exempt
organization will likely be UBTI because it will be income received
from a trade or business that is not “substantially related” to the taxexempt organization’s purpose and is “regularly carried on” by the
tax-exempt organization. 28 Even if all the income is not classified as
UBTI, then at least the portion of the profits that result from
leveraged investments will be taxed as UBTI. 29
The diagram below shows a simplified version of how a taxexempt organization invests in a hedge fund.

22. TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 2.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP OF FINANCIAL
MATTERS, PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 41 (2009) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES].
27. Id.
28. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2012).
29. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 230–31; see also I.R.C. § 514(a).
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Since profits from hedge funds will almost certainly trigger UBTI, a
tax-exempt organization uses the blocker corporation loophole to
earn a tax-free return on its investment.
III. BLOCKER CORPORATIONS AND PASSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
COMPANIES

A. Taxing Corporations in General
Unlike partnerships, corporations do not pass through profits
and losses to their shareholders. 30 Instead, earnings are effectively
taxed twice: once at the corporate level and again when dividends are
paid to shareholders. 31 Under this tax scheme, it becomes clear why
hedge funds are organized as partnerships—to allow their investors
to avoid double taxation.
Given the pass-through tax structure associated with
partnerships that triggers UBTI and the double taxation of
corporations, it would seem that a tax-exempt organization that
wants to invest in a hedge fund is presented with only two options,
both requiring some tax to be paid by the organization. Either the
organization can be a partner in a partnership and be taxed on UBTI,

30. See I.R.C. § 11.
31. See id. §§ 11, 301.
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or the organization can be a shareholder of a corporation and receive
relatively smaller tax-free returns because of an initial corporate tax
on earnings as high as 35%. 32
However, what if the tax-exempt organization could receive its
tax-free dividend on an undiminished return because of a 0%
corporate tax rate? Such a situation could not exist if the corporation
was set up in the United States, 33 but it certainly could exist, and
indeed it does, if the corporation is set up in the Cayman Islands or a
similar tax jurisdiction. 34 Meet the foreign blocker corporation. 35

B. The Foreign Blocker Corporation
In order to prevent a hedge fund from passing UBI to its taxexempt partner, the income is instead passed from the hedge fund to
a blocker corporation. 36 UBTI does not pass through from
corporations to shareholders. Thus, “if tax-exempt organizations
hold potentially [UBTI]-producing investments through a
corporation, the . . . look through rule does not apply, and
dividends paid by the corporation to the tax-exempt investors
generally are excluded from the investors’ unrelated business taxable
income.” 37 The diagram below shows a simplified blocker
structure.38
32. See id. § 11.
33. See id.
34. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 8.
35. “Generically, a blocker or stopper is an entity inserted in a structure to change the
character of the underlying income or assets, or both, to address entity qualification issues, to
change the method of reporting, or otherwise to get a result that would not be available without
the use of more than one entity.” Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity
Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1, 1 (2011). Although the blocker corporation can be used in
other contexts, this Comment specifically uses the terms “blocker corporation,” “blocker
structure,” and “blocker loophole” to reference only a tax-exempt organization’s use of such a
structure in a non-tax or low-tax jurisdiction.
36. See PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 42.
37. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 4.
38. Most blocker corporation schemes are considerably more complex than the one
depicted, but the basic graphic shown accurately represents the benefits blocker corporations
provide to tax-exempt investors. Often, tax-exempts are simply a player in what is called a
“master-feeder” structure, which “combines a ‘master fund,’ often an investment company
exempt from the Investment Company Act, domiciled in a low tax or no tax jurisdiction such as
the Cayman Islands, with an offshore ‘feeder fund,’ another exempted company domiciled in the
same jurisdiction as the master fund, and an onshore LLC or LP, which is also a ‘feeder fund.’
Investors subscribe to the feeder funds, which ‘feed’ or ‘upstream’ their assets to the master
fund, and the combined pool of assets is managed at the master-fund level. By investing in the
offshore feeder, non-U.S. investors usually avoid being subject to U.S. taxes and the reporting
requirements that arise when non-U.S. investors generate taxable income that is effectively
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Understandably, the blocker structure has become a preferred
investment model for tax-exempt organizations that wish to invest
in hedge funds. 39 Not only will tax-exempt investors not have to pay
tax on a dividend pay-out, but that pay-out will also not be
diminished by a corporate tax rate since the corporate tax rate in the
Cayman Islands is 0%. 40

C. PFIC Rules, Tax-Exempt Organizations, and Blocker Corporations
U.S. taxpayers that are shareholders of a PFIC are taxed on the
PFIC’s income under a different regime that is beyond the scope of
this Comment.41 A PFIC is a foreign corporation that meets one of
connected to the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. For U.S. tax-exempt
investors, the offshore feeder fund acts as a ‘blocker company’ and may enable these investors to
avoid being subject to Unrelated Business Taxable Income (‘UBTI’). This structure enables taxexempt investors to participate in investment partnerships that use leverage as part of their
investment strategy.” PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 41–42 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., id. at 41–42.
40. Cayman Islands Highlights 2012, DELOITTE (2012), http://www.deloitte.com/
assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20
Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight_2012_Cayman%20Islands.pdf.
41. “Alternative sets of income inclusion rules apply to U.S. persons that are shareholders
in a passive foreign investment company, regardless of their percentage ownership in the
company. One set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are ‘qualified
electing funds,’ under which electing U.S. shareholders currently include in gross income their
respective shares of the company’s earnings, with a separate election to defer payment of tax,
subject to an interest charge, on income not currently received. A second set of rules applies to
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the following tests: (1) 75% or more of the corporation’s gross
income is passive income, such as dividends, interest, royalties,
rents, and annuities (the “income test”); or (2) the average
percentage of assets that the corporation holds that produce passive
income or are held for the production of passive income during a
taxable year is at least 50% (the “asset test”). 42 Many blocker
corporations will be classified as PFICs because they will almost
certainly meet either the income or asset tests (probably both in
most cases).43
Prior to 1998, there was some confusion regarding how the PFIC
rules applied to tax-exempt organizations. 44 In 1998, the Treasury
Department issued a temporary regulation that discussed how a taxexempt organization shareholder of a PFIC is treated under §
1291.45 The temporary regulation is now current law, and it reads,
“If the shareholder of a PFIC is an organization exempt from tax
under this chapter, § 1291 and these regulations apply to such
shareholder only if a dividend from the PFIC would be taxable to the
organization under subchapter F.” 46 This particularly short
regulation exempts tax-exempt organizations from the PFIC tax
regime.

passive foreign investment companies that are not qualified electing funds, under which U.S.
shareholders pay tax on certain income or gain realized through the company, plus an interest
charge that is attributable to the value of deferral. A third set of rules applies to passive foreign
investment company stock that is marketable, under which electing U.S. shareholders currently
take into account as income (or loss) the difference between the fair market value of the stock as
of the close of the taxable year and their adjusted basis in such stock (subject to certain
limitations), often referred to as ‘marking to market.’” TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 19–20.
42. I.R.C. § 1297 (2012).
43. If U.S. shareholders who own at least 10% of a foreign corporation collectively own
greater than 50% of a foreign corporation, the foreign corporation is classified as a “Controlled
Foreign Corporation” and is subject to taxation under the rules of Subpart F rather than the
PFIC regime. See I.R.C. § 1297(d); I.R.S. Instructions for Form 8621 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8621.pdf. The details of Subpart F are beyond the scope of this
Comment, but the Subpart F rules generally cause a U.S. shareholder to recognize deemed
dividend income even though the corporation does not actually pay a dividend to the
shareholder. See I.R.C. § 957. However, in the case of tax-exempt organizations, these deemed
dividend payments are still exempt from taxation under the UBTI exceptions unless the deemed
dividends payments are debt-financed. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11; I.R.C.
§ 512(b).
44. See General Rules for Making and Maintaining Qualified Electing Fund Elections, 63
Fed. Reg. 6 (Jan. 2, 1998).
45. See id.
46. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1291-1 (2013). A discussion of Subpart F income is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
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IV. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CLOSE THE BLOCKER LOOPHOLE

Even though the IRS does not consider the blocker loophole
abusive and has sanctioned its use in tax planning structures, 47
Congress should close this loophole for four main reasons: the
blocker corporation is an unintended consequence of the UBTI rules,
the blocker corporation structure fails a substance over form
analysis, and closing the loophole will provide increased revenue to
avoid the Fiscal Cliff.

A. An Unintended Consequence
The blocker corporation is a loophole that is exploited by taxexempt organizations. 48 When Congress passed the debt-financed
income rules in 1969 to prevent sophisticated sale-leaseback
transactions, 49 Congress was attempting to prevent tax-exempt
organizations from distorting the market. Basically, Congress did not
want tax-exempt organizations to be a commercial establishment
without paying the associated income taxes.
Hedge funds were not as popular of an investment vehicle in the
1960s and 1970s as they are today. Indeed, hedge funds are not
specifically mentioned in the legislative history associated with the
Revenue Act of 1950 or the 1969 debt-financed rules. 50 However,
even though tax-exempt organizations’ investments in hedge funds
were not mentioned as a target of the legislation, the general idea of
the legislation is still applicable. If tax-exempt organizations are
going to invest in a hedge fund, they should have to pay tax on either
the pass-through UBTI or on the dividend from a corporation that is
an investor in the fund.
The foreign blocker loophole is simply an unintended
consequence of the Revenue Acts of 1950 and 1969. The corporate
blocker is not popular domestically because of relatively high
domestic corporate tax rates that would be imposed on the blocker’s
earnings from the hedge fund. The structure is usually only
financially beneficial if the blocker corporation is domiciled offshore
in a low corporate tax jurisdiction. While this particular structure,
and many other loopholes in the Code, are legal, that does not mean
they are optimal, necessary, or even warranted.

47.
48.
49.
50.

See Brunson, supra note 2, at 242–45.
See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 68–69.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See Brunson, supra note 2, at 246.
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B. Failing a Substance over Form Analysis
The blocker corporation fails a substance over form analysis. U.S.
taxpayers are generally bound by the economic substance of a
transaction rather than by the transaction’s legal form, meaning that
a taxpayer will be taxed on the economic reality of a transaction even
if the form or design of the transaction might indicate otherwise. 51
The UBTI rules were enacted to prevent tax-exempt
organizations from acting too much like a commercial business and
to prevent them from distorting the market. With those purposes in
mind, it makes sense that a tax-exempt organization has an income
tax liability on income passing through from a hedge fund. A hedge
fund’s activities are clearly not related to any tax-exempt
organization’s purpose, which is why the flow through income can
be taxed as UBTI.
The blocker corporation loophole allows a tax-exempt
organization to receive its return on investment from the hedge fund
as a tax-free dividend instead of UBI. The substance of a tax-exempt
organization’s investment into a hedge fund is not changed simply
by inserting a blocker corporation in a zero- or low-tax foreign
jurisdiction. In both cases, a tax-exempt organization is acting like a
normal commercial business. The existence of a blocker corporation
does not change the fact that a tax-exempt organization is still
ultimately receiving a return on an investment from activities not
related to the tax-exempt organization’s purpose. The substance (the
economic reality of receiving a return on an investment from
unrelated business activity) of both transactions is largely, if not
completely, the same. By utilizing the loophole, the tax-exempt
organization avoids tax by merely funneling money through a foreign
blocker corporation into a hedge fund rather than investing the
money in the hedge fund directly. The only difference between the
two investment models is the form or design of the transaction.
Although U.S. tax law respects corporations as separate legal
entities 52 and the IRS has not labeled the blocker loophole as
abusive,53 a substance over form analysis is not foreign to the IRS or
the courts.54 The IRS has routinely challenged certain tax structures

51. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
52. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69.
53. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 242–45.
54. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467. Gregory is considered one of the landmark
“substance over form” cases. The case involved a taxpayer that used the business reorganization
rules under the Code to receive preferential tax treatment on the sale of some shares of stock.
The taxpayer utilized a transaction structure or form that enabled her to claim such preferential
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using a substance over form analysis, and Congress has amended
previous tax laws when they were not actually working as planned. 55
Even though the IRS has sanctioned the blocker loophole, the IRS
should challenge the substance of the structure. If the IRS does not
do so, then Congress should change the Code in ways that will be
outlined later in this Comment.
Notably, some scholars argue that the blocker corporation
necessarily changes the substance of the investment because the
blocker corporation, as a partner of the hedge fund, is liable for the
debt that the hedge fund incurs when making its investments. 56 The
tax-exempt organization would not be liable for the hedge fund’s
debt under the blocker structure because of the corporate veil. 57 If a
tax-exempt organization cannot be held liable for the debt, then the
argument is that the organization should not bear a tax burden
either.
Although this argument might seem compelling, there are
examples in the Code of tax-exempt private foundations being
required to bear a tax burden based on the receipt of certain
corporate dividends. 58 For example, § 4940 imposes an excise tax on
investment income, including dividend income that a tax-exempt
private foundation receives from any source. 59 It is true that the
blocker corporations paying out the dividends would certainly have
liability for their own debts and that liability would not be able to be
passed through to the tax-exempt organization shareholder.
However, the absence of liability for debt has not prevented taxexempt private foundations from incurring a tax liability on income
received from a corporate dividend payout.

treatment, which was technically in conformity with the Code. However, the Commissioner
argued that the economic substance of the transaction was actually not a business reorganization
as the taxpayer claimed. Instead, the economic substance of the transaction was a dividend
payment. The Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner because the newly created corporation
was “nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described [to receive preferential tax
treatment]. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended
from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been
exercised, it immediately was put to death.” Id. at 469–70.
55. See supra Part II.B.1.
56. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69.
57. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (2012).
58. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4940 (relating to investment income excise tax).
59. Id.
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C. Increased Revenue to the Treasury
During the 2012 presidential election, voters listened to the
presidential candidates talk about closing loopholes and eliminating
unnecessary deductions and credits found in the Code in order to
raise additional revenue. 60 The charitable tax deduction, mortgage
interest deduction, and the Child Tax Credit were often discussed
because many Americans are at least somewhat familiar with these
issues. Although those particular deductions and credits are certainly
relevant, tax reform must also include some initiatives aimed at the
Code’s “mysteries” that are beyond the familiarity of the average
American voter and not easily printed on a bumper sticker.
If Congress were to close the blocker loophole, which only
benefits the wealthiest and most sophisticated tax-exempt
organizations, 61 it would not likely cause too much public criticism
because many Americans probably do not realize that asset-rich taxexempt organizations utilize complex international tax structures to
avoid an increased tax liability. Hence, Americans might be receptive
to multi-billion dollar university endowments paying an increased
tax bill. Moreover, closing loopholes like the foreign blocker
loophole might be one way for the United States to attempt to rectify
its massive debt crisis. Although the United States has far from a
balanced budget, revenue increases seem to be a necessary
component of a balanced approach to solving the United States’
financial woes. 62
V. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
This Comment will now discuss several ways Congress could
close the blocker loophole. Some suggestions would completely close
the loophole for all tax-exempt organizations, and others would only
60. See Transcript of First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/politics/transcript-of-the-first-presidential-debate-indenver.html?pagewanted=all.
61. More often than not, only the wealthy and highly sophisticated taxpayer can afford to
take advantage of loopholes because professional tax lawyers and accountants are needed to
perform highly technical readings of the Code and provide written opinions for complex tax
structures. In additional to a professional opinion from a tax firm, tax payers will often also pay
the firm to draft private letter rulings from the IRS to ensure the organization will not be
audited. Typical private letter rulings cost a client around $50,000. See PRIs and Private Letter
Rulings, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/
downloads/PRIsAndPrivateLetterRulings.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
62. See Transcript of First Presidential Debate, supra note 60. In a recent press conference,
President Barack Obama seemed open to the idea of closing loopholes as a means of raising
revenue. Id.
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partially close the loophole with respect to private foundations. This
Comment argues that the optimal approach is to completely close
the loophole, given the reasons discussed above. However, partially
closing the loophole might be the most practical solution
considering the political realities Congress must deal with while
enacting tax reform.

A. Completely Closing the Blocker Loophole
Although partially closing the blocker loophole is a possibility,
Congress should completely close the loophole by targeting the core
parts of the Code that facilitate the loophole: the PFIC rules and the
UBTI rules. Congress could completely close the blocker loophole by
amending both the PFIC rules and the UBTI exceptions.

1. Amend the PFIC rules
The first step to closing the blocker loophole is for Congress to
amend the PFIC rules. Although the taxing scheme that applies to
PFICs 63 is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note
that many foreign blocker corporations will qualify as PFICs under
§ 1291 by either meeting the income test or asset test, and thus be
subject to the PFIC tax and interest regime. 64 The Regulations,
however, state that “[i]f the shareholder of a PFIC is an organization
exempt from tax under this chapter, § 1291 and these regulations
apply to such shareholder only if a dividend from the PFIC would be
taxable to the organization under subchapter F.” 65 Therefore, the
PFIC regime generally does not apply to tax-exempt organizations
receiving dividends from a blocker corporation.
Congress should strike Treasury Regulation 1.1291-1(e). If this
specific regulation was amended, tax-exempt organizations, as
shareholders in foreign blocker corporations, would incur a PFIC tax
liability. Perhaps the most significant benefit to amending the PFIC
rules is simplicity. Congress would not need to write new statutory
language, except perhaps a few words to clarify that a tax-exempt
organization can indeed be subject to the PFIC regime.
A tax-exempt organization utilizing the blocker corporation
would be presented with a choice under the amended PFIC rules: the

63. TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 19–20.
64. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
65. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1291-1(e)(1) (2013). Although a discussion of Subpart F income is
beyond the scope of this Comment, one example of taxable Subpart F income to a tax-exempt
organization is debt-financed income.
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organization can be subject to the PFIC tax regime or invest directly
into the hedge fund and pay a tax on the pass-through UBTI from
the hedge fund. Both choices result in a tax that should eliminate the
tax benefits of the blocker loophole.

2. Amend the UBTI exceptions
The second step to completely closing the blocker loophole is for
Congress to amend the UBTI rules, which impose a tax on any part
of a tax-exempt organization’s income that meets the following
requirements: (1) income received was from a trade or business; (2)
the trade or business must be “regularly carried on” by the taxexempt organization; and (3) the trade or business was not
“substantially related” to the tax-exempt organization’s purpose. 66
The Code carves out certain exceptions to the UBTI rules, including
dividends, which consequently, but inadvertently, include dividends
from blocker corporations. 67 Section 512(b)(1) should be amended
to disallow an exception for dividends paid by foreign corporations
that are partners in a hedge fund. Section 512(b)(1) currently reads:
There shall be excluded all dividends, interest, payments with
respect to securities loans (as defined in subsection (a)(5)),
amounts received or accrued as consideration for entering into
agreements to make loans, and annuities, and all deductions
directly connected with such income. 68

Congress should add a new sentence to the end of the current
provision which states:
This section shall not apply to dividends, interest, payments with respect to
securities loans (as defined in subsection (a)(5)), amounts received or accrued
as consideration for entering into agreements to make loans, annuities, and all
deductions directly connected with such income if they are received from a
foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund.

The proposed amendment would force tax-exempt organizations that
use the blocker structure to pay a tax on a dividend received from
the blocker corporation. As with the proposed PFIC changes, the
proposed change to § 512(b)(2) offers a tax-exempt organization a
choice: pay a tax on dividends received from foreign blocker
corporations or invest directly into the hedge fund and pay an

66. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
67. Id. § 512(b).
68. Id. § 512(b)(1).
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income tax as a partner of the hedge fund. Both choices result in a
tax on pass-through UBTI. These choices should deter the use of the
blocker corporation and keep more capital in the United States,
which makes sense because many hedge funds’ actual assets are
located in the United States. 69

B. Partially Closing the Blocker Loophole
As lawmakers consider closing the blocker loophole, they will
undoubtedly be met with special interest opposition from taxexempt organizations and their lobbyists. Since Congress might not
be willing to make political enemies with all tax-exempt
organizations at once, this Comment proposes several solutions to
partially close the blocker loophole. Admittedly, these suggestions
would probably not solve the problem, but at least these suggestions
would start the process. Under the following proposals, Congress
would increase the § 4940 and § 4944 taxes on private foundations.
Then, over time, Congress could extend these reforms to all taxexempt organizations by amending § 509.

1. Increase the 4940 excise tax
One way to close the blocker loophole with respect to taxexempt private foundations is to make the § 4940 excise tax steeper.
Section 4940 states in part:
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on of its activities, a
tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such
foundation for the taxable year. 70

If private foundations are investing large amounts of money and
receiving decent returns, a 2% tax amounts to nothing more than a
small price to pay for doing business unrelated to their tax-exempt
purposes. Although the legislative history to § 4940 “indicates that
the purpose of the tax is to raise only enough revenue to finance the
administration of the code provisions relating to private foundations
and other tax-exempt organizations,” 71 Congress could choose to
substantially increase the excise tax with respect to dividends paid

69. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69.
70. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2012).
71. Richard R. Upton, Private Foundations: Many Routine Investment Activities Are Neither
Subject to the Section 4940 Excise Tax nor to UBIT, 38 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 393, 394 (2002).
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from blocker corporations. For example, the excise tax on
investment income received from blocker corporations could be
equal to the tax-exempt organization’s income tax rate, which would
effectively put an income tax on the blocker payouts. Thus, § 4940
could be modified as follows:
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on of its activities, a
tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such
foundation for the taxable year, unless the investment income is derived

from a foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund, which would
then trigger a tax on the foundation’s net investment income from the foreign
corporation.

Such a change would effectively remove the tax benefit of the
blocker loophole because the dividends the foundation receives from
foreign blockers will not be exempt under the UBTI rules.

2. Change § 4944 and its corresponding Regulations
Section 4944 of the Code imposes a 10% tax on investments that
may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt purpose. 72 The
Regulations state that
an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of
the exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is determined that
the foundation managers, in making such investment, have failed to
exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and
circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in
providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the
foundation to carry out its exempt purposes. 73

Importantly, no category of investments is treated as a per se
violation of § 4944. 74 The Regulations give several examples of
jeopardizing transactions. Although the blocker structure is not
described in one of the examples, perhaps the following example is
somewhat related:
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of
$100,000. A approves the following three investments by B after
taking into account with respect to each of them B’s portfolio as a

72. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) (2012).
73. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2013).
74. Id.
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whole: (1) An investment of $5,000 in the common stock of
corporation X; (2) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock
of corporation Y; and (3) an investment of $8,000 in the common
stock of corporation Z. Corporation X has been in business a
considerable time, its record of earnings is good and there is no
reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings. Corporation Y has
a promising product, has had earnings in some years and
substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, and is widely
reported in investment advisory services as seriously
undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period
of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by
others, and must compete with a well-established alternative
product that serves the same purpose. Z’s stock is classified as a
high-risk investment by most investment advisory services with the
possibility of substantial long-term appreciation but with little
prospect of a current return. A has studied the records of the three
corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each case the price
per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B. Under
the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the investment
of $10,000 in the common stock of Y and the investment of $8,000
in the common stock of Z may be classified as jeopardizing
investments, while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock
of X will not be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial
tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part
thereof) in the taxable period for the investment in Y, and an initial
tax of $400 (i.e., 5 percent of $8,000) for each year (or part thereof)
in the taxable period for the investment in Z. Further, since A had
actual knowledge that the investments in the common stock of Y
and Z were jeopardizing investments, A would then be liable for the
same amount of initial taxes as B. 75

Judging from the language of the Regulation and its
corresponding example that labeled investments in companies Y and
Z as jeopardizing, investments hit with the § 4944 excise tax are
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Since no category of investment can
be a per se violation of this Regulation, the blocker structure,
especially if it is overseen by sophisticated tax lawyers and
accountants, is not likely to be subject to this Regulation as written
unless unusual circumstances are present.
The Treasury Department should expand the example to include
a tax-exempt organization investing in a corporate blocker that is a

75. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(c) (2013).
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shareholder in a heavily leveraged hedge fund. The expanded
example should therefore read:
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of
$120,000. A approves the following four investments by B after taking
into account with respect to each of them B’s portfolio as a whole:
(1) An investment of $5,000 in the common stock of corporation X;
(2) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of corporation
Y; (3) an investment of $8,000 in the common stock of corporation
Z; and (4) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of F, a foreign
corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund. Corporation X has been in
business a considerable time, its record of earnings is good and
there is no reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings.
Corporation Y has a promising product, has had earnings in some
years and substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend,
and is widely reported in investment advisory services as seriously
undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period
of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by
others, and must compete with a well-established alternative
product that serves the same purpose. Z’s stock is classified as a
high-risk investment by most investment advisory services with the
possibility of substantial long-term appreciation but with little
prospect of a current return. Corporation F is a foreign corporation that

primarily invests in hedge funds that engage in leveraged investments. In this
case, the hedge fund is heavily leveraged. A has studied the records of the
three corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each case the
price per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B.
Under the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the
investment of $10,000 in the common stock of Y, the investment of
$8,000 in the common stock of Z, and the $10,000 investment in the
common stock of F may be classified as jeopardizing investments,
while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X will not
be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial tax of $ 500
(i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the
taxable period for the investment in Y, an initial tax of $ 400 (i.e., 5
percent of $8,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable
period for the investment in Z, and an initial tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent
of $10,000 for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the
investment in F. Further, since A had actual knowledge that the
investments in the common stock of Y, Z, and F were jeopardizing
investments, A would then be liable for the same amount of initial
taxes as B.

If such an example were included, it would give courts an
opportunity to rule that excessive leveraging could be a factor in
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determining a jeopardizing investment. The excise tax could remain
at 10% because the excise tax is imposed on the value of the
investment rather than the return on the investment.

3. Extend the proposed changes to § 4940 and § 4944 to all tax-exempt
organizations
Once the proposed changes to § 4940 and § 4944 are
implemented, Congress should then extend the changes to all taxexempt organizations. The most efficient way for Congress to
accomplish the extension of § 4940 and § 4944 to all tax-exempt
organizations is to amend § 509, which is the section that defines
“private foundation.” 76 Congress should add a subpart to § 509 that
reads, “Any organization that normally would not be defined as a
private foundation will be considered a private foundation with
respect to dividends received from a foreign corporation that is a
partner in a hedge fund and with respect to investments made into a
foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax-exempt organizations should not be able to receive tax-free
dividends from foreign blocker corporations that invest in hedge
funds for three reasons: the blocker corporation is an unintended
consequence of the UBTI rules, the blocker corporation structure
fails a substance over form analysis, and closing the loophole will
provide increased revenue to the United States Treasury. With those
reasons in mind, Congress should close the blocker loophole using
one of two strategies. Perhaps the most practical strategy is for
Congress to increase the excise taxes on private foundations and
then apply those excise taxes to all other tax-exempt organizations
over time. Ideally, Congress should completely close the blocker
loophole for all tax-exempt organizations by amending PFIC and
UBTI rules. In the meantime, tax-exempt organizations will continue
to utilize the blocker loophole and invest in unrelated business
activities abroad with minimal income tax consequences.

Andrew M. Dougherty *

76. I.R.C. § 509 (2012).
* J.D., 2013, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School. I would like to give
a special thanks to professors John W. Welch and J. Clifton Fleming Jr. for their assistance.
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